spacer
Home spacer
space spacer
Newsletter  
spacer
 
spacer  
spacer  
spacer  
spacer
spacer  
spacer
spacer  
spacer
spacer  
spacer
spacer
Current Edition
February 2008
Volume 3 Issue 4
 
Feature Article
spacer
Current Cases of
Interes
t
spacer
Hot Cases
spacer
Archives
 
Our Firm Our Practice Our Attorneys spacer
spacer
Our Clients Our Newsletter Contact Us spacer
spacer

Hot Cases

spacer
Designation and Status of Corporate Litigation Witnesses
spacer
spacer
spacer
spacer
spacer
Designation and Status of Corporate Litigation Witnesses
spacer

One of the differences between litigation in federal court and state court is the manner by which an adversary notices of the deposition of a corporation, and the location for deposition of various corporate witnesses.

In federal court deposition practice, a corporation is often requested in the first instance to produce individuals who are officers, directors or managing agents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)6. The deposition notice usually sets forth a set of categories for which the adversary is requesting witness testimony, and the corporation selects a responsive witness.

Unlike state court practice in New York, an adversary in federal court litigation may not notice the deposition of a corporation by a particular person who is not an officer, direct or managing agent. In fact, where the deposition of one who is not an officer or director is sought, the witness is considered a non-party, and the attendance of the “non-party” employee of a corporation at deposition must be procured by subpoena pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Convermat Corporation v. St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Company, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69102 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Ruinsky v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13149 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The significance here is that the “non-party” employee will have to be subpoenaed and deposed in or about the district where that person works or resides, unless otherwise agreed. That “non-party” employee cannot be forced to come to New York if they work and reside out-of-state and more than one hundred miles away (F.R.C.P. 45), unless otherwise agreed.

Frequently, it is not an officer or director who possesses first-hand factual information. This becomes particularly important in federal court practice with regard to the category of “managing agents.” The question of whether a person is a managing agent, and therefore subject to a notice of deposition, is answered on a fact-specific basis, and courts generally consider factors such as:

1) Whether the individual is invested with general powers allowing the individual to exercise judgment and discretion in corporate matters;

2) whether the individual can be relied upon to give testimony, at the employer’s request, in response to the demands of the examining party;

3) whether any person or persons are employed by the corporation in positions of higher authority than the individual designated in the area regarding which the information is sought by the examination;

4) the general responsibilities of the individual respecting the matters involved in the litigation; and

5) whether the individual can be expected to identify with the interests of the corporation.

See, Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Ottis Elevator Company, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44200 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). (holding that the examining party bears the burden of establishing the status of the witness, and that the determination of managing agent status is often reserved until the time of trial).

In New York state court practice, the Civil Practice Law & Rules § 3106 provides that a party seeking the deposition of a corporate entity may designate any employee, officer or director to be examined. One potential advantage pursuant to CPLR § 3106 over the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the ability in New York state court practice for the corporation to avoid producing top management personnel, at least in the first instance. However, the caveat is that a non-managerial employee at the initial deposition may be asked questions as to corporate practices and procedures, and counsel representing the corporation must be aware of whether the non-managerial employee is a knowledgeable witness for that broad area of inquiry.

Also to be noted under New York State practice is that if the corporation has a multi-state presence and the individual employee to be examined has an out-of-state work location and residence, a simple subpoena served on corporate offices will suffice to force the sought corporate employee to come to New York for deposition. e.g. Standard Fruit and Steamship Company v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 43 N.Y.2d 11, 371 N.E.2d 453, 400 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1977); 23/23 Communications Corp. v. General Motors Corporation, 172 Misc. 2d g 21, 660 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. N.Y. Co. 1997) (out-of-state employee may be required to appear for deposition merely upon notice to the employer, if it is a party to the case before the Court, but at the adversary’s expense.)

Corporate litigants are also cautioned that in New York state and federal courts, some non-party employees are subject to ex-parte interview by opposing counsel prior to depositions. Pursuant to Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1), a corporate employee is generally deemed to be a “party” not subject to interview by opposing council if the employee whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation, and imputed to the corporation. Niesig v. Team I et al., 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1990). Yet, conversely, an employee who merely witnessed an incident may be subject to ex-parte informal interview by an adversary. The interview may not, however, touch upon privileged information existing between that employee and corporate counsel.

Our firm has experience in addressing these issues for a wide range of corporate clients in many different settings. One of our strengths is in laying out these issues for the client at the outset, and methodically addressing the various corporate witnesses.

  Rule 30(b)6 provides in pertinent part, that “A party may in the party’s notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested.  In that event, the organization so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which the person will testify.”

spacer
Back to Top
spacer
spacer
Arons v. Jutkowitz, 2007 NY Slip Op 09309 (2007)

This case which deals with informal discovery was decided by the Court of Appeals in November 2007. The Court held that attorneys may conduct exparte interviews of an adversary’s non-treating physicians and that such interviews are not prohibited by HIPAA.

In conducting such interview, attorneys should make their identity and interest known to the interviewee as well as that the interview is voluntary; limit the interview in scope to particular medical condition at issue; and, conduct themselves according to the ethical rules. Since the filing of a note of issue cuts off further discovery absent unusual or unanticipated circumstances, the Court favors conducting the exparte interviews prior to the filing of a note of issue.

The Court stated that such interviews are not prohibited by HIPAA because the statute does not address it. However, HIPAA does impose certain procedural prerequisites to conducting this discovery (“the Privacy Rule does not prevent this informal discovery from going forward, it merely superimposes procedural prerequisites”). In this regard, prior to conducting the interview, the attorney seeking it must obtain a HIPAA compliant authorization from plaintiff (plaintiff has no basis for refusal since brought suit waiving physician-patient privilege), or must obtain court or administrative order; or must issue a subpoena, discovery request or other lawful process with satisfactory assurances relating to either notification or a qualified protective order. The Court also held that other court imposed requirements such that defendant provide plaintiff with copies of all written statements, notations, video recording or transcripts, etc. obtained during the interview, are improper.

spacer
Back to Top
spacer
Haymon v. Pettit, 2007 NY Slip Op 9071, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 3281 (2007)

This case decided on November 20, 2007 deals with the issue of duty.  Specifically, whether a baseball park operator owes a duty to warn or protect non-patron spectators who are injured while chasing foul balls that are hit out of the stadium. 
           
The infant plaintiff, age 14, was struck by a car while chasing a foul ball into traffic.  At the time, the stadium was offering free tickets to non-patrons who retrieved foul balls that were hit out of the stadium and returned to the ticket window.  The infant’s mother claimed that the stadium’s promotion give rise to a duty of care to warn or protect its participants.  That is, that the promotion foreseeably exposed children to the hazard of chasing foul balls into the street.  The Court disagreed noting that there are inherent risks associated with crossing the street.  This along with the fact that the ball park operator could neither control the public streets nor third party, weighed in favor of finding no duty.  As set forth by the Court:

Under theses circumstances, it is difficult to imagine what steps the stadium operator could have taken that would have sufficed to meet a duty.  Thus, we are constrained from imposing a requirement that the stadium exercise control over non-patron, third persons outside its premises over whom it has no actual authority to do so.

spacer
Back to Top
spacer
Ortega v. City of New York,, 9 N.Y.3d 69, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 2715 (2007)

This matter was decided on October 16, 2007.  The Court of Appeals declined to recognize an independent tort for third-party negligent spoliation of evidence.  This issue was left open by the Court in MetLife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, 1 N.Y.3 478, 775 N.Y.S.2d 754 (2004).
           
The day after plaintiff had her vehicle serviced, the vehicle burst into flames just after she smelled fumes and pulled it off to the side of the road.  Both plaintiff and her passenger suffered injuries.  After the fire, the car was towed to a towing facility and then ultimately to the police auto pound.  Plaintiff’s passenger obtained a court order granting him a 60 day period to inspect the vehicle and precluding its alteration or destruction until completion of the inspection.  Despite service of the order on the police department and its forwarding to the auto pound, the vehicle was destroyed prior to the expiration of the 60 days. 

Plaintiffs commenced an action against the City for their injuries claiming that by destroying the vehicle, the City breached its duty to preserve evidence and thereby committed the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence. A cause of action for civil contempt was also asserted . The City moved for summary judgment on both causes of action. Plaintiffs did not commence an action against the previous vehicle owner, service station or the auto manufacturer.

Although acknowledging that the City had a duty to preserve the vehicle (duty owing to passenger who obtained order of preservation) and negligently breached it, the Court declined to follow other jurisdictions which have recognized the cause of action. Among the reasons given for declining to recognize the cause of action is that New York has remedies which are adequate to deter spoliation or appropriately compensate its victims. Further, even in cases in which discovery sanctions are inadequate to address the spoliation victim's loss, civil contempt claims could be pursued. The Court also noted that if such a tort were recognized, in order for plaintiffs to prove their claims, plaintiffs would have to rely on various levels of speculation as to how the breach of duty to preserve evidence caused damages in the underlying action (proximate cause). Additionally, there were public policy factors which weighed against recognition of such a cause of action, to wit, apportionment of liability among joint tort feasors and creation of signification liability for municipalities.

This cause of action was previously dismissed and no appeal was taken from the dismissal.

spacer
Back to Top
spacer
spacer
spacer
spacer
spacer
spacer
 
spacer
Copyright © 2008 Gallagher Gosseen Faller & Crowley • DisclaimerSitemap • Attorney Advertisement created by fd moore design, ltd.